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Law has two dimensions: on the one hand, it can be linked to the maintenance of an unjust status 
quo; but, on the other hand, it can also be an instrument of fight for any social actor. This 
idea will be developed throughout the analysis of the right to self-determination, object to the 
present article.
Self-determination is a rather old concept understood as self-governance before the states. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, social actors recognized this concept as a right, 
and subsequently as a human right. This article will focus on the notion of self-determination 
from a theoretical point of view, while also mentioning some historical elements that will 
complement the historical relevance this right has had. Hence, I will first start by explaining 
what self-determination meant from John Locke´s standpoint, which is linked to natural law-
liberalism. Likewise, I will consider the Marx-Leninists perspective that supported the African 
decolonization. Finally, I will illustrate how global indigenous movements reinterpreted the 
notion of self-determination and materialised it through the Bolivian Constitution.  With this, 
the reader will see how law and human rights are both indeterminate and difficult-to-reconcile 
concepts. 
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Resumen
El derecho tiene dos dimensiones: puede representar un statu quo injusto, pero asimismo puede 
representar una herramienta de lucha aplicable a cualquier actor social. Esta idea es desarrollada 
en este artículo a través del análisis del derecho a la autodeterminación.
La autodeterminación es un viejo concepto que representa el autogobierno ante los Estados. Sin 
embargo, recién a principios del siglo XX se reconoció como derecho y, posteriormente, como 
derecho humano. En este artículo, se analiza la noción de autodeterminación desde un alcance 
teórico sin dejar de lado algunos elementos históricos. Primero, el artículo explica lo que significó 
la autodeterminación desde el punto de vista de John Locke como representante de la ley natural: 
el liberalismo. Posteriormente, se analiza desde la perspectiva de Marx y Lenin, quienes se cons-
tituyeron en un fundamento a favor de la descolonización africana. Finalmente, se resalta cómo 
los movimientos indígenas globales reinterpretaron la noción de autodeterminación a través de 
la Constitución boliviana y el concepto de Sumak Kawsay. Este caso ejemplifica cómo el derecho 
y los derechos humanos pueden ser un territorio indeterminado y disputable.
Palabras clave: autodeterminación, derechos humanos, movimiento indígena.
Introduction
This article outlines how international human 
rights bodies have implemented the right to 
self-determination, being this an example of 
the duality of law as it can represent a crucial 
strategy to support social struggle, but simul-
taneously could be an instrument to reinforce 
the interest of neo-liberalism (Kennedy, 2003).
For that purpose, I will analyse several histori-
cal milestones on self-determination.  To start 
with, I will cover Locke’s conceptualization 
of self-defence as a natural right. Afterwards, 
I will move on the Marxist understanding to 
evaluate how this line of thought redirects 
this notion by criticizing extensively Locke’s 
categorization while simultaneously highlights 
self-determination in favour of African 
decolonization symbolized in “the wretched of 
the Earth” (Fanon, 2004) during the twentieth 
century. Finally, this article exposes how the 
right to self-determination is nowadays 
addressed anew. In this case, not by African 
demands, but by indigenous social claims, 
which were not conducted against the classical 
Nation-State figure, but rather as an attempt to 
deepen the understanding of collective rights, 
understood as rights of Mother Earth, while 
trying to rebuild the relationship between 
nature and human beings. An example of 
this legal transformation represented by the 
Bolivian Constitution is also discussed.
The malleability of the human 
rights discourse
According to Moyn (2010), human rights rep-
resent the ultimate utopia. This idea emerges 
as an alternative before other movements 
such as pan-Africanism, anticolonialism, 
communism, and Marxism, all examples that 
had proven to be unable to transcend the 
nation-state concept. In this sense, I agree with 
Campbell (2011) who attributes the popularity 
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of the human rights concept to their priority 
and legalization: “To have a right is to have 
something that overrides other considerations 
in both moral and legal discourse. It is a 
language high normative force that demands 
our attention.” (Campbell, 2011, p. 2). 
However, rights are associated with the 
language of remedies and thus “rights are part 
of a practical discourse that not only invites, 
but requires action to be taken in response 
to the claims that the very right expresses. 
Rights, then, are seen as means of protection 
against the abuse of power” (Campbell, 2011, 
p. 2). Here, this author concurs with Dworkin, 
inasmuch as “rights are trumps” which resort 
to similar characteristics of Campbell’s 
understanding of rights. 
Certainly, it is a legalistic approach grounded 
in authors like Hohfeld (1978). However, it 
does not mean that I believe in a “celebration of 
human rights” (De Sousa Santos, 2015). It would 
be naive to consider that this legal discourse 
might become some sort of “magic wand” used 
to solve all contemporary social issues.
Human rights could represent the preservation 
of an unjust status quo by means of law enforce-
ment, which simultaneously could lead to the 
discouragement of social movements. In that 
sense, Tushnet (1984) develops four critiques of 
the role of law as an obstacle for social eman-
cipation, namely instability, generalization, 
indeterminacy, and reification. Accordingly, 
several activists and scholars believe that the 
Human Rights discourse is a methodology to 
conduct a deep and global legal movement, 
which would intertwine with social demands. 
In this way, De Sousa Santos (2015) uses the 
concept of subaltern cosmopolitan legality 
as a strategy to deploy a counter-hegemonic 
approach to globalization. 
Law and human rights have a subtext which is 
subordinated to the context of who wrote the 
legal texts and when they were written. The 
legalization of human rights has been an area 
of dispute and struggle that has gone beyond 
the legal framework, “…to which the making 
of human rights norms and standards remain 
a dialectical process of inclusion and exclusion. 
The multiple readings that are made of the 
legal text help to reinterpret the hegemonic 
position of who writes the legal texts.” (Baxi, 
2006, pp. 182-183)
In order to describe this duality, it is necessary 
to undertake a sociological (Bourdieu, 1984) 
and anthropological (Moore, 2001) approach, 
as their views coincide with the understanding 
of law as a semiautonomous field.
According to Bourdieu (1984), law should be 
understood as a social field, since it is the site 
of struggle and competition for control. Indeed, 
this field sets out what is to be controlled; it 
determines the issues that must be socially 
meaningful, as well as its social practices, 
which are the product of the operation of 
this “field”. Likewise, the logic of this field is 
determined by two factors: on the one hand, by 
the specific power relations that determine its 
own structure, or more precisely, the conflicts 
over competency that occur within it; and 
on the other hand, by the inner structure of 
legal thought, which constantly constrains the 
range of possible actions and, thereby, limits 
the realm of specifically juridical solutions 
(Bourdieu, 1984).
Consequently, the history of law and the 
history of the internal development of its 
Edición
118 Bogotá D.C. Colombia  •  No. 50  •  julio - diciembre de 2018  •  pp. 115-130  •  Ejemplares: 500  •  ISSN: 0124-0021
Three theories about the right to self-determination
concepts and methods have formalized what is 
now called jurisprudence. This latter sees law 
as an autonomous and closed system whose 
development can only be understood in terms 
of its “internal dynamics”.
Implicitly (Douzinas, 2007, p. 2), in accordance 
with Bourdieu states: 
…rights do not refer to things or other 
material entities in the world, but are pure 
combinations of legal and linguistic signs, 
words and images, symbols and fantasies. 
Thus, the autonomy of legal thought and 
action results in the establishment of a 
specific mode of theoretical thinking. 
(Douzinas, 2007, p. 2)
These combinations between power relations 
and the logic of legal thought, is crucial to 
understand the right to self-determination and 
their historical background. This perception is 
also shared by Moore (2001) and her vision of 
law as a problem-solving mechanism.
In the work of the legal anthropologist Sally 
Falk Moore, law comes to be understood into 
a “semi-autonomous field” (Moore, 2001, p. 
103). She asserts that law has a “rationalist 
framework used in the legal profession” as 
one of the keys of Weber´s sociology. Moore 
undertakes the essay of the well-known legal 
realist, Karl Llewellyn1 to understand law as 
problem-solving mechanism.
Although Moore knows that law can be 
interpreted as a means to favour the dominant 
power, she argues that law has been expanded 
in favour of the oppressed since the decoloniza-
tion process in the sixties.
1 For more information: Llewellyn, K. & E. Hoebel 
1941. The Cheyenne Way. Norman, Ok.: University 
of Oklahoma Press.
Law was seen as a representation of social 
order, but it was understood to be usable 
in a great variety of ways by people acting 
in their own interest. The strong and 
powerful could, of course, further their 
interests more effectively than the weak. 
(Moore, 2001 p. 104)
Moore (2001) also mentions several authors 
who find that different legal mechanisms 
require constant negotiation processes. From 
an analytic standpoint, she illustrates this idea 
with some examples towards normative justice 
that first appeared in Gulliver (1963). This 
latter author observed that the Arusha people, 
in colonial Tanganyika, often managed their 
legal disputes, not by attending the existing 
(colonial) Native Courts, but by means of 
an “informal", non-official system where the 
parties reached negotiated settlements. There, 
lineage representatives of the contending 
parties assembled and bargained solutions 
on behalf of the principals. Gulliver (1963) 
concluded that the winners of these negotiated 
settlements were always the more politically 
powerful parties. In these negotiations, the 
discourse revolved around norms, but he also 
argued that such norms did not determine 
the outcome. He contrasted this negotiation 
process with judicial decisions, in which he 
assumed that the outcome was determined 
normatively. Hence, he not only assumed that 
a normative system existed, but also that this 
system was systematically enforced at informal 
tribunals (Moore, 2001).
Further, Moore incorporates another impor-
tant element to regard law as a social field: 
negotiations among different actors turn out to 
be key to establish who rule the power relations 
in society, but also within the inner logic of 
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law, in agreement with the aforementioned 
Bourdieu argumentation. The next section 
will introduce one of the first authors that 
described the idea of self-determination. 
The concept of  
self-determination in Locke
Locke represents the values of the bourgeoisie 
with some remaining traces of the British 
monarchy. In Locke, the unbreakable relation-
ship between law and morals is revealed; there 
cannot be any formal law, with no higher moral 
aspiration. Nevertheless, that morality should 
be embedded in the state norms. He believed in 
a natural right granted by God and therefore all 
men were to hold the same right. “God, as King 
David says, has given the earth to the children 
of men—given it to mankind in common.” 
(Locke, 2017)
If we consider natural reasons, which 
tells us that once men are born, they 
are granted the right to survive and 
thus the right to food and drink and 
such other things as nature provides 
for their subsistence, or revelation that 
gives us an account of the grants that 
God made of the world (Locke, 1689).
According to Locke, freedom is the way to 
materialize this natural right. Men are born 
with the right to perfect freedom, with an 
uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and 
privileges of the law of nature. Men are equally 
granted to enjoy those rights with any other 
man or men in the world. Thus, men, by nature, 
have power not only to preserve their property 
but also their freedom. No one can deprive men 
from their freedom as men all being naturally 
free, equal, and independent, are also subject 
to the political power of someone else without 
their own consent (Locke, 2017).
With this, it is easy to identify some similar 
aspects to the universal principles of Human 
Rights. In Locke’s words “men all being 
naturally free, equal and independent”, it is pos-
sible to identify a given precondition to being 
holders of the fundamental right: ownership 
of property. In this sense, if someone does not 
own properties, in accordance with the design 
of God, then that person does not hold any 
rights. In consequence, slaves make the rights 
of the bourgeois possible. 
Master’ and ‘servant names as old as 
history, but very different relationships 
can be characterized by them. A free man 
may make himself a servant to someone 
else. But there is another sort of servant 
to which we give the special name ‘slave’. 
A slave is someone who, being a captive 
taken in a just war, is by the right of nature 
subjected to the absolute command and 
arbitrary power of his master. A slave has 
forfeited his life and with it his liberty; 
he has lost all his goods, and as a slave 
he is not capable of having any property; 
so he can’t in his condition of slavery be 
considered as any part of civil society, the 
chief purpose of which is the preservation 
of property. (Locke, 2017, pp. 27-30)
However, his categorization of that person 
who was incapable of owning any property 
lied on the concept of “Slave” as being a person 
who had been made captive in a “just war”. 
Notwithstanding this, he claimed that “wild 
Indians” did not have any right to property, 
and consequently, slaves and indigenous were 
not part of civil society. 
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The wild Indians ·in North America· 
don’t have fences or boundaries, and are 
still joint tenants ·of their territory·; but if 
anyone of them is to get any benefit from 
fruit or venison, the food in question must 
be his—and his (i.e. a part of him) in such 
a way that no-one else retains any right to 
it. (Locke, 2017)2
As a result, Locke’s approach was focused 
on the owners (the bourgeoisie) since they 
represented the civil society which actually 
have some sort of social incidence. In other 
words, Locke understands society balance and 
correctness as the peace provided by property 
owners as they bring about a desirable state: “… 
a state of peace among its members; they are 
kept from the state of war by the provisions they 
have made for the legislature to act as umpire, 
ending any conflicts that may arise among of 
them”. Hence, proprietors are the ones who can 
exercise the right to self-determination.
Self-defense is a part of the law of nature, 
and it can’t be denied to the community, 
even against the king himself; but that 
law doesn’t allow them to revenge them-
selves upon him. So if the king of hatred 
sets himself not merely against this or 
that person but against the body of the 
Commonwealth of which he is the head. 
Preservation of property, peace, and 
unity among themselves, those who set 
2 In this paragraph the author describes “All the fruits 
it naturally produces and animals that it feeds, as 
produced by the spontaneous hand of nature, belong 
to mankind in common; nobody has a basic right—a 
private right that excludes the rest of mankind—over 
any of them as they are in their natural state. But they 
were given for the use of men and; before they can be 
useful or beneficial to any particular man there must 
be some way for a particular man to appropriate them”. 
up force again in opposition to the laws 
do rebellare, those who say I am laying 
a foundation for rebellion mean that my 
doctrine may lead to civil wars or internal 
unrest. ·What do they infer from that·? I 
tell the people •that they are absolved from 
obedience when illegal attempts are made 
upon their liberties or properties and •that 
they may oppose the unlawful violence of 
those who were their law-officers when 
they invade their properties contrary to 
the trust put in them. (Locke, 2017, p. 76)
Although Locke introduces some hypothesis 
to understand “the ferment of rebellion”, for 
instance, when people are made miserable 
and find themselves exposed to mistreatment 
by arbitrary power, he also considers rebellion 
illegitimate when an inferior imposes upon a 
superior. For him, it is legitimate to overthrow a 
bad king and simultaneously, it is inconceivable 
to attack the body of the commonwealth by its 
head the king.
They may push back the present attempt 
but must not take revenge for past vio-
lence; for it is natural for us to defend 
life and limb, but it is against nature for 
an inferior to punish a superior… it must 
be without retribution or punishment 
because an inferior cannot punish a 
superior. (Locke, 1689, p. 77) 
At this point, it is important to refer to Douzi-
nas as the vision of Locke relies on the social 
contract among ‘free men’ where the ‘rights 
of men’, ultimately refer to a well-off citizen, 
who is a heterosexual, white male. “This man 
of rights condenses in his identity the abstract 
dignity of humanity and the real prerogatives of 
belonging to the community of the powerful” 
(Douzinas, 2007, p. 2).
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Self-determination in  
Marx-Lenin (1848-1960)
In this section, a specific period from the com-
munist manifesto to the legalization of the right 
to self-determination will be characterized 
as a transition from the bourgeois concept 
of self-determination to the proletarian and 
anticolonialist struggle that ended up with 
the United Nations’ recognition of this right. 
Therefore, here the focus will be addressed 
to how the notion of self-determination was 
reinterpreted taking into account the African 
decolonization process. 
It is well known that Marx did not believe in 
“the rights of man” as inherent to the human 
condition, thereby he was clearly against the 
notion of natural law. As opposed to Locke, 
he considered that rights are determined by a 
specific context, rejecting Locke’s Universalist 
concept. On the other side, for him –Marx–, 
rights are not innate; rather, these rights have 
been taken away from the status quo, in that 
case, the bourgeoisie. This perspective led sev-
eral of the main critical subsequent currents of 
human rights. For example, in his famous book 
On the Jewish Question, Marx (1843) briefly 
analysed some of the following arguments:
The question is whether the Jew as such, 
that is, the Jew who himself admits that 
he is compelled by his true nature to live 
permanently in separation from other 
men, is capable of receiving the universal 
rights of man and of conceding them to 
others. 
For the Christian world, the idea of the 
rights of man was only discovered in the 
last century. It is not innate in men; on 
the contrary, it is gained only in a struggle 
against the historical traditions in which 
hitherto man was brought up. Thus, the 
rights of man are not a gift of nature, not a 
legacy from history, but the reward of the 
struggle against the accident of birth and 
against the privileges, which up to now 
have been handed down by history from 
generation to generation. These rights are 
the result of culture, and only one who has 
earned and deserved them can possess 
them. (Marx, 1843, p. 10)
Moyn (2010), on the other hand, ingeniously 
shows how the true concept of “the rights 
of man” is subject to the category of citizen, 
“the ‘rights of man’ were about incorporating 
people into a state, not a few foreign people 
criticizing another state for its wrongdoings” 
(Moyn, 2010). 
Additionally, Marx proposed the communist 
state as the state in which private property 
would be abolished, completely opposed to the 
bourgeois precepts, because it is a sine qua non 
condition that turned out to be admissible to 
exercise rights, including self-defence. In his 
Manifesto, he addresses the issue on how a new 
social order would be like. “In fact, the abolition 
of private property is, doubtless, the shortest 
and most significant way to characterize the 
revolution in the whole social order” (Marx & 
Engels, 1969, p. 47).
With this, it is possible to infer that Marx’s 
understanding of self-determination had to 
do with a fight against the origin and values 
of the bourgeoisie. For instance, his manifesto 
mentions how…
The discovery of America, the rounding 
of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for 
the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian 
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and Chinese markets, the colonization 
of America, trade with the colonies, the 
increase in the means of exchange and in 
commodities generally, gave to commerce, 
to navigation, to industry, an impulse 
never before known, and thereby, to the 
revolutionary element in the tottering 
feudal society, a rapid development. (Marx 
& Engels, 1969, p. 15)
Likewise, Marx thought the proletariat would 
overthrow the bourgeoisie not just in Europe, 
but elsewhere around the world, by identifying 
another crucial phenomenon called colonial-
ism. Marx and Engels (2008) wrote in several 
letters on colonialism. They described how it 
was first developed in China and India, and set 
out their plausible resistance against European 
colonizers:
The Chinese revolution will throw the spark 
into the overloaded mine of the present 
industrial system and cause the explosion 
of the long-prepared general crisis, which, 
spreading abroad will be closely followed 
by political revolutions on the Continent. It 
would be a curious spectacle, that of China 
sending disorder into the Western World 
while the Western powers, by English, 
French and American war-steamers are 
conveying “order” to Shanghai. (Marx & 
Engels, 1850-1888, p. 25)
Furthermore, Lenin consequently adopted 
Marxist precepts about the “right of man”, 
and colonialism. He was the first to consider 
the implementation of self-determination 
through rights. He went back to question what 
self-determination of nations meant. 
Naturally, this is the first question that 
arises when the attempt is made at a 
Marxist examination of what is known 
as self-determination. What should be 
understood by that term? Should the 
answer be sought in legal definitions 
deduced from all sorts of “general con-
cepts” of law? Or is it rather is sought in a 
historical-economic study of the national 
movements? (Lenin, 1972)
Lenin´s dilemma could easily be solved from 
a materialistic approach; by which I mean 
focussing on a historical-economic analysis.
If we want to grasp the meaning of self-
determination of nations, not by juggling 
with legal definitions, or “inventing” 
abstract definitions, but by examining 
the historical-economic conditions of the 
national movements, we must inevitably 
reach the conclusion that the self-deter-
mination of nations means the political 
separation of these nations from alien 
national bodies and the formation of an 
independent national state. (Lenin, 1972)
To sum up, this Marxist interpretation contrib-
utes to the process of African decolonization, 
although African leaders did not initially 
believe that self-determination should be 
achieved through human rights. Franz Fanon 
(2004) was one of the most sceptical about 
it. Briefly, I highlight some points that Fanon 
took from Marxism to construct a theoretical 
proposition that would contribute paradoxi-
cally to the constitution of self-determination 
as part of the body of international law.
Self-determination 
implemented by means human 
right discourse
Regarding the evolution of the right to self-
determination, the truth is that it was not 
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initially considered a part of human rights. 
Additionally, its restricted scope generated 
scepticism and disillusionment, not only within 
the movements of African decolonization, but 
also in the so-called third world and against 
the European colonizer. At this point, it is 
necessary to go back to Moyn (2010) who 
argued that the right to self-determination 
was a consolation prize for the anti-colonialist 
struggle: “Anticolonialism rarely framed their 
cause in rights language before 1945. The 
Colonial Subject was painfully aware that 
Western ‘humanism’, had not been kind to 
them so far” (Moyn, 2010 p. 87). 
Further, Moyn (2010) asserts, “when the 
decolonization resulted in enough new states 
to matter at the UN, the phrase Human Rights 
itself came to be incorporated in the master 
principle of collective self-determination” (p. 
97). He concluded that the anticolonialism 
lesson for the history of human rights is not 
about the growing relevance of the concept 
across the post-war era. “It is about the ideo-
logical conditions in which human rights in 
their contemporary connotations become a 
plausible doctrine” (Moyn, 2010, pp. 87-88).
Although Moyn’s critique is crucial to remem-
ber the category of law as a “social field”, it also 
considers the duality of human rights. Certainly, 
Human rights could emerge as a consolation 
prize whether one compares the real dimension 
of the African decolonization, yet it has also 
become an important tool to meet other social 
claims. In that sense, as Terreta posits (2013), 
it is wrong to minimize the empowerment of 
the human rights discourse acquired after the 
period of African decolonization.
The human rights movement parted ways 
with liberation politics in order to achieve 
the prominence it eventually did in the 
global North, where human rights were 
narrowly redefined as negative protections 
for individuals, a safeguard against physical 
pain and trauma. But I date this divergence 
to the end of the UN trusteeship system 
circa 1960 and demonstrate that the new 
sort of human rights movement that swept 
in muted—but did not fully displace—the 
revolutionary one that had preceded it. 
(Terretta, 2013, p. 398)
With this brief background in mind, I will now 
focus on how the Latin American indigenous 
movements have reinterpreted the right to self-
determination in terms of achieving autonomy 
and emancipation through the figure of the 
State, opposite to the African decolonization 
demands as they claimed autonomy toward 
State. 
It should be noted how the reconfiguration 
of the right to self-determination has been 
developed in a context where the indigenous 
claims go beyond anthropocentrism, classical 
legal thought, individual rights, and respect 
to Mother Earth (also referred to as Pachama-
manism).
The right to self-determination 
applied by Latin-American 
Indigenous movements
The way indigenous people of Latin America 
have understood this right is outside of both 
Locke’s social contract and his concept of 
citizenship and civil society, and the Marxist 
approach, where the indigenous communities 
were discarded (Wallerstein, 1991).
This article will describe the kind of theo-
retical framework that would be necessary to 
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determine what the right of self-determination 
means for the Latin-American Indigenous 
movements. Hence, the Indigenous claims 
will be analysed, including, for example, the 
conception of cosmopolitan legality by De 
Sousa Santos (2005).
This latter concept is useful to understand the 
indigenous claims in terms of self-determi-
nation. De Sousa Santos (2002) approaches 
consists of recognizing legality as a counter-
hegemonic discourse and practice. According 
to him, “law is not all about state law and 
individual right, the idea of autonomy and the 
idea of rights are both means and ends of social 
practice” (2000, p. 30). 
Furthermore, this author identifies three new 
characteristics created for the Indigenous 
social movement to be included in cosmopoli-
tan legality. 
Firstly, this neo-law was regarded as the 
indigenous struggle for legality having, in turn, 
a double struggle: the struggle for a collective 
right to create laws and rights, including the 
recognition of their collective rights, and their 
self-determination into the national state law 
and international law. Thus, these indigenous 
claims notoriously transcend the legal modern 
nation-state model. 
Secondly, a neo-state considers the roots of 
the struggle of indigenous people as a radical 
critique of the nation-state model, since it 
exposes the implicit social exclusion and 
suppression of minorities. The indigenous 
movements open an ideological space for a 
profound revision of the liberal state in terms 
of sovereignty.
Lastly, the author refers to neo-community 
understood as the claim for “the principle of 
the community”, by which I mean the idea of 
a horizontal politics obligation between the 
indigenous groups and the states.
These categorizations are key to interpret how 
the Latin American indigenous movements 
have developed their social struggle. The Neo 
law, new state, and new community concepts 
are included into the Bolivian Constitution. 
This lays out foundations to analyse how the 
right to self-determination was applied in that 
context.
Another remarkable research in this analysis 
is Tomeselli’s (2016). He states that there are 
three macro-categories of autonomous or 
self-determined indigenous territories recog-
nized by their states, namely: a). indigenous 
autonomy arrangements that have been legally 
established as a result of conflict resolutions 
(Chittagong Hill Tracks in Bangladesh; 
Papua and Aceth in Indonesia; the Atlantic 
Coast in Nicaragua, etc.), b). Self -govern-
ment arrangements derived from high-level 
debates followed by incisive constitutional 
or domestic law reforms (the Indigenous 
Peasant Native Autonomies in Bolivia; the 
circunscripciones in Ecuador; the indigenous 
autonomies of Mexico, the reformed autonomy 
of Greenland from Denmark, etc.), and .c). 
Arrangements developed into new legal 
autonomy understanding by constitutional 
or other amendments of domestic laws (the 
resguardos systems in Colombia).
With this context, the purpose is now to intro-
duce some theoretical frameworks carried out 
by Latin-American indigenous movements, 
from what I call “insider perspective”, in 
terms of the right to self-determination 
claim. I especially consider crucial Tomaselli’s 
category of “Self -government arrangements 
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derived from high-level debates followed 
by incisive constitutional or domestic law 
reforms” (2016). This concept could explain 
several cases of constitutional reforms 
undertaken by indigenous peoples such as 
Bolivia and Ecuador.
The Bolivian constitution of 
2009
The Bolivian constitution represents the new 
right to self-determination; this process has 
been regarded as part of the Latin American 
constitutionalism, confronting the classical 
notion of legal thought.
The Socialist Movement of Workers, MST 
(Movimiento Socialista de Los Trabajadores 
in Spanish), set one of the most important 
backgrounds for this Constitution. They took 
parts of the ayllu3 model and adapted them 
to structure their political organization at 
the community, regional, and national level 
(Fabricant, 2012, p. 79).
The state had previously divided land and 
territory through a model of citizenship that 
assigned property rights to individuals, but 
MST claimed that the land ownership had to do 
with more than a piece of individual property—
it is rather a collective right. The occupation 
of land, or what they call a “reconquest” of 
sorts, is about reclaiming and reterritorializing 
indigenous control and autonomy over those 
lands and their critical resources (Fabricant, 
2012, p. 79).
3 The traditional form of a community in the Andes, 
especially among Quechuas and Aymaras. They are 
an indigenous local government model across the 
Andes region of South America, particularly in Bo-
livia and Peru
Likewise, Marcia Stephenson (2000), describes 
the political, cultural, and ideological uses 
of the ayllu, and explains how this model is 
articulated as an Andean political body in 
which the four parts of the Tawantinsuyu 
and the Inca Empire, the largest empires in 
pre-Columbian America, are intertwined.
Concerning the constitutional text, according 
to Copa Pabón (2015), the first article of the 
constitution should be understood beyond 
the classic state structure as well as the 
regulations of the political charter. This article 
of the Bolivian Constitution establishes that: 
“Bolivia is constituted as a Social Unitary State 
of Plurinational Community Law. [...] Bolivia 
is based on plurality and political, economic, 
legal, cultural and linguistic pluralism, within 
the integrating process from the country.
The configuration “Social Unitary State of 
Plurinational Community Law” (without 
commas), reflects the constitutional, 
social and political transition of the Boli-
vian State. In simple words, this transition, 
in our opinion, seeks the “overturn” of 
the old to the new, of the alien to the 
own; of a Social Rule of Law anchored in 
the Republican “Nation-State”, towards a 
Plurinational Community State, founded 
on the plurality and pluralism of nations 
and peoples. (Copa Pabón, 2015, p. 263)
As a result, the African-self-determination is 
overpassed, since it focussed on the relation-
ship between a colonizing and a colonized 
state. In the Bolivian case, the concept of 
plural nations is located in the contours of the 
nation-state. In addition, it turns away from the 
classic notion of self-determination by Locke, 
because the concept of the property-owning 
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citizen and individual rights has no bearing. 
Here too, different actors appear indigenous, 
community, Pachamama and the rights of 
Mother Nature (Copa Pabón, 2015, p. 264.
Although these rights were not enacted 
in 2009, the Constitution recognizes the 
importance of protecting nature, it does not 
constitutionally entrench the rights of nature, 
as does its Ecuadorian counterpart. However, 
the rights of nature (or Mother Earth) and their 
protection were instead set out in two statutes: 
(i) Law 071 of the Rights of Mother Earth of 
2010 (Ley 071 de Derechos de la Madre Tierra 
-Law of the Rights of Mother Earth-), which 
enumerates specific rights to which Mother 
Earth is entitled, and (ii) Framework Law 300 
of Mother Earth and Integral Development for 
Living Well of 2012 (Ley Marco de la Madre 
Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien) 
(Villavicencio & Kotze, 2018, p. 3).
Similarly, in Bolivia, there is a plurinational 
representation. I refer to Pacari (1984), who 
says, “the solution for the colonial situation 
would be the “transformation of the current 
power of the Uninational. […] State toward a 
plurinational state”. This truly multinational 
and pluricultural state in which each national-
ity has the right of self-determination and the 
free choice of social, political and cultural 
alternatives. 
Additionally, the concept of self-determination 
is fully recognized within the principles of the 
Bolivian constitution. Thus, plurinationality 
as the succinct expression of the diversity of 
Bolivian reality is founded on four fundamental 
bases: a) The “self-determination of peoples”, b) 
“Plurality” and “pluralism”, c) “Decolonization” 
and d) Sumak Kawsay. With this, it is possible 
to say that the self-determination of indigenous 
peoples is exercised through the recognition 
of collective rights, which is an anticolonialist 
discourse in harmony with nature, and respect 
for community values from a holistic way. For 
example, the notion of Sumak Kawsay aims 
to restore collective life in all its dimensions, 
as an alternative reaction to the dominant 
development model (Macas, 2010).
 Likewise, Houtart (2011) explains what the 
Sumak Kawsay means. This explanation 
highlights how this concept aims to create 
another paradigm, which would be outside of 
the capitalist logic in the interest of becom-
ing an instrument to encourage any social 
movement.
Sumak Kawsay is a new word for integral 
development, inspired by the tradition and 
the discourse of the indigenous peoples, 
and that wants to propose, with an original 
contribution, a change of paradigm in 
front of the capitalist conception of the 
development. Similar intellectual efforts 
exist in African and Asian societies, and 
it is the set of all these initiatives that 
will help to specify the objectives of the 
various social movements and political 
organizations that fight for a change of 
society. (Houtart, 2011)
At the same time, Sumak Kawsay is grounded in 
some values, which are intrinsically connected: 
Pakta kausay, (Balance): Through communal 
work, individual and collective equilibrium is 
achieved; Alli kausay (harmony): the balance 
allows sustaining the collective and individual 
harmony; runakay (know-how to be) is the sum 
of all the elements noted above. Runa literally 
means the person, the human; the runakay 
synthesizes the realization of the human being, 
to achieve this dimension. It is essential to learn 
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how to gradually comply with each one of the 
values described above. 
Consequently, the notion of self-determination 
implemented in the Bolivian constitution has 
other parameters, which are born in their own 
cultural practices, without the classic division 
between “man” and “nature”. That explains why 
Indigenous peoples intend to preserve their 
culture and cosmogony as a political act.
Conclusions
After the different issues addressed and 
discussed within this article, there are several 
remarkable reflections concerning the right to 
self-determination to have in mind. 
1) The materialization and evolution of human 
rights has led to a permanent duality. Its dis-
ambiguation relies upon several factors, such 
as acknowledging who writes the human right 
to consider (Baxi, 2006). This discourse can 
be considered sometimes regressive for social 
movements and concomitantly supportive to 
capitalist logics (Kennedy, 2003). Human rights 
can equally become the ultimate utopia (Moyn, 
2010) of contemporary societies in order to 
achieve higher levels of democratization, 
emancipation and collective well-being. At this 
point, we should consider the incorporation of 
the right to self-determination within the body 
of international law of the peoples’ rights. If this 
right had not been incorporated and recognized 
within the language of human rights, it would 
have not contributed to struggles as dissimilar 
as those of the indigenous movements in Latin 
America.
2) It is valuable to review Locke’s objectives 
(1689) –who favoured the bourgeoisie, although 
purportedly, he talked of the rights of all men-, 
together with Lenin’s ideas (1972) –who 
represented the proletariat, but subsuming 
minorities–, and the indigenous movements, 
who surpassed the legalistic concept and 
nation-state notion-. The latter achieve such 
surpassing with an initiative that started as an 
anti-capitalist project that addressed this self-
determination by means of Sumak Kawsay, a 
different episteme, and the rights of Mother 
Earth- as a means to understand the specific 
case of self-determination as a human right, 
This article did not conduct a historical devel-
opment of the right to self-determination, it 
rather illustrated how Bolivia’s indigenous 
movement have developed political theories 
from a different episteme to defend certain 
interests by means of law. From my personal 
point of view, I consider that, if we understand 
these dynamics from the Bourdieu and 
Merry’s approaches, we will find law as an 
indeterminate social field and a concept hard 
to reconcile from two different perspectives: 
the relationship between power relations, and 
the inner logic of law. 
As I have remarked in another unpublished 
article, the right to self-determination has 
been used at the international level by differ-
ent means: the first, by the United Nations 
Declaration on Indigenous People (2007). 
It has also been nationally implemented in 
countries like Bolivia, and also against the 
law (Zapatista movement) as well as a mean 
to surfing the national law (CRIC-Colombia´s 
case4. This information has been collected 
through Legal Consciousness Studies in the 
United States.
4 Abbreviation in Spanish: (Consejo Regional Indígena 
del Cauca). Regional Council of the Cauca)
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3) Although the Latin American indigenous 
movements use law as a strategy to achieve 
self-determination, its claim arises from an 
ancestral right that is outside the western 
logics, sovereignty and civil society of the 
nation. This right is exercised concomitantly 
with other rights. For example, the right to 
self-determination is unimaginable if the right 
to territory is not exercised. Here, territory 
means an ancestral place, where the indigenous 
peoples’ worldview takes place and the Sacha 
Pacha (the forest) shares the same origin and 
destiny. 
Hence, the Bolivian case evidences how social 
movements, represented by MST, resorted to 
their ancestral believes, ayllu, together with 
political strategies in order to assure better 
conditions for their political struggle. Such 
efforts set the foundations for the new Bolivian 
Constitution established in 2009.
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